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The Natiori has no peculiar relation to corporations created by
the States.' It can deal with them only as it can deal with unin-
corporated associations, partnerships and individuals. Incor-
poration gives a privilege. The power which gives it may reserve
the right to regulate its enjoyment, that is, the conduct of the
association so privileged. In the nature of things, such right can
be reserved only in the grant of the privilege and only by the
grantor. The fact that an association of men is incorporated by
one State cannot be made the basis of regulation by any other
power. Incorporation under the laws of one or more States of
the Union, gives no basis for control or regulation by the United
States. The basis for Federal action must be found outside of
the fact uf such incorporation, in something which, regardless of
incorporation, brings the association within the field of Federal
jurisdiction, under the provisions of the Constitution. State
incorporation gives neither a ground for, nor a shield against,
Federal interference.
If a partnership runs a stage between two villages in Vermont,
its business being confined to that State, even the most advanced
advocate of centralization will admit that its business cannot be
regulated by Congress. If the partnership is changed into a cor-
poration, or, in other words, if the same association of individuals
is incorporated by the State of Vermont, the business being
l.mited as before, the corporation, equally with the previous
partnership, is beyond the reach of congressional regulation. The
power of Congress is unaffected by incorporation.
Substitute for the two villages in Vermont, two villages, one
of which is in Vermont, and the other across the Connecticut
River, in New Hampshire, so that the business is interstate tran-
sportation. Then such business undoubtedly may be regulated
by Congress under its power to regulate interstate commerce. And
this is equally so while the individuals who carry it on remain a
mere partnership and after they have become a corporation.
Regulation may be applied to the business because of 'its char-
' Corporations created by Congress are outside of the purview of
this article.
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acter. The legal character of the association, the fact that it is or
is not incorporated, in no way affects the question.
Suppose a further change is made, and the business of the
association is both carriage between two villages in Vermont and
carriage between two villages, one in Vermont and one in New
Hampshire. Business of the former kind is outside of the power
of Federal regulation; business of the latter kind is within such
power. The one kind of business may and the other may not be
regulated by Congress. The association generally is not subject
to such regulation, but only the interstate business which it does.
The fact that the same body of men carry on both kinds of busi-
ness cannot extend the power of Congress; and the power is
precisely the same, whether they are associated as a partnership
or as a State corporation. That part of the business which is
within the definition of interstate commerce, is subject to regula-
tion under the powers referred to; the rest of the business is not.
The association may be regulated with respect to its interstate
business, but only with respect to such business. Whether it is
incorporated or not, whatever it does is free from, or subject to,
Federal regulation, according as what it does is without or within
the field of interstate commerce.
The Interstate Commerce Act in no sense attempts to regulate
corporations; it regulates commerce only. It has lately been
extended so as to cover express business. Some of the express
companies are incorporated; some of the important ones are not.
The Anti-Trust Act of 189o, does not mention corporations,
except in declaring that the word "person" as therein used, in-
cludes "corporations." It prohibits certain doings-if the word
"certain" may be used, though it is still uncertain what the pro-
hibited doings are. It applies whether the doers are corporations
or natural persons. It is the character of the business, not the
character of those who do it, which gives to Congress the right
to regulate it, and is to be considered in any proceeding under
the Act.
When individuals are more frequently prosecuted under these
acts, it will be more generally realized that they are not based
upon any peculiar relation of the Nation to corporations, but upon
the power of Congress to regulate interstate and foreign com-
merce by whomsoever carried on.
In the proposals for Federal regulation of corporations, it is
sometimes urged that corporations are peculiarly subject to State
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regulations, because of the franchises which they enjoy. The
State by which a franchise is granted, may regulate the use of
such franchises, if this right is reserved in the grant. But no
other sovereignty can base a right of regulation upon such grant
or such reservation therein. Whether a corporation enjoys only
the franchise of corporate being-as is true of all industrial
corporations-or enjoys, in addition to such franchise, a pre-
rogative franchise such as that of maintaining and operating a
railroad, the fact that it enjoys such franchise or franchises by
grant from one or more of the States, gives no basis whatever
for regulation of its business by the Federal Government.
With reference to the Federal Government, then, corporations
created by the States stand upon the same footing as natural
persons; if their business may be regulated, it is because of the
character of the business, because such business-by whomsoever
it may be carried on-is of the kind which is subjected to Federal
regulation by the Constitution.
All this is quite obvious; but the obvious is often overlooked.
Argument is unnecessary. Reference to authorities would be a
waste of effort. It needs only to be pointed out. That it is over-
looked is shown by much of the talk upon many legislative sug-
gestions which are heard in these days.
The conclusions from what has been pointed out are both
restrictive and expansive. Limitations are seen to lie in the way
of some legislative measures proposed. But on the other hand,
it equally appears that some proposals should be broadened. If
there is any reason for any suggested form of regulation as
applied to business done by corporations, there must be the same
reason for regulation of like business done by individuals,
partnerships and unincorporated associations. Since the power
of the Nation depends in no way upon incorporation, incorpor-
ation neither extends nor limits the power. Since it is the char-
acter of the business and not the legal character of the agency by
which it is done which gives Congress its right of regulation, the
legal character of the agency does not limit the power of Con-
gress in its regulation of the business. Nor does it appear that
there can be any difference in expediency, whether the agency is
incorporated or not. The regulations which seem wise with
respect to the business should not, therefore, be limited in their
application to incorporated bodies. They should be general-as
are the regulations of the Anti-Trust Act and the Interstate Coin-
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merce Act-applying to the doings of individuals and unincor-
porated associations in like manner as to those of corporations.
And the propriety of their enactment should be tested by the
thought that they must, in reason, be made so to apply.
There are doubtless those who think-without much thinking-
that to draw the line in such matters between corporations and
agencies unincorporated, is simply to distinguish between things
large and small. But this is a mistake. A partnership which
becomes incorporate gains nothing in size or power. On the other
hand, there are associations unincorporated which are larger and
stronger than all but the largest corporations. Several important
combinations have been organized lately by mere agreement, and
the express companies give examples of association on a large
scale without incorporation. If regulations are to be adopted as
to any business, there would seem to be no reason why persons
doing such business as individuals, or in unincorporated associa-
tions, should find themselves outside of their reach. Indeed, it
would seem that incorporation cannot properly be made a basis
of differentiation or of classification in any enactment by the
Nation, unless it would cut free from the rule of equality of
burden which is imposed upon the States by the Federal Consti-
tution.
Reference ought, perhaps, to be made to the very interesting
case of Butler Brothers' Shoe Company v. United States Rubber
Company, (U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals, 8th Circuit) 156 Fed.
Rep. i. It was there held that the State of Colorado could not
prohibit a foreign corporation, engaged in interstate commerce,
from engaging in such commerce within that State; and in effect
this was an assertion of the power of Congress to regulate such
corporation with respect to such business. But no point was
made of the incorporation of the company. The basis of the
decision was that the business which the company did was inter-
state commerce, the regulation of which belonged to Congress
exclusively. It mattered not that the association which carried
it on was incorporated. It was the character of the business, no
matter what the legal character of the agency conducting it, which
put it beyond the regulative power of the State. I find nothing
in this case, nor in any of the cases cited therein, to throw any
doubt upon any of the statements of this article, or of the article
on Corporations and the States, published in the December, i9o7,
number of this Journal. Thomas Thacher.
